This paper develops a model in which an optimal capital structure and an optimal debt maturity are jointly determined in a stochastic interest rate environment. Valuation formulas are derived in closed form and numerical solutions are used to obtain comparative statics. The model yields leverage ratios and debt maturities that are consistent in spirit with empirical observations. It is demonstrated that a dynamic model is crucial to obtain reasonable leverage ratios and that a stochastic interest rate is important to study optimal debt maturity structure. It is also demonstrated that a model of optimal capital structure with a constant interest rate cannot price risky bonds and determine optimal capital and debt structures simultaneously in a satisfactory manner.
capital structure. This implies that the firm does not derive tax benefits from issuing bonds.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of optimal capital structure with stochastic interest rates. At time zero the firm issues a T -year coupon bond. If the firm has not gone bankrupt in T years, the firm issues a new T -year coupon bond at time T . The optimal value of the new bond will depend on the firm value and interest rate at time T . If at the end of the second T -year period the firm is still solvent, it issues another T -year coupon bond optimally. This process goes on indefinitely as long as the firm is solvent. The optimally levered firm value at time zero takes into account the tax benefits associated with all future leverages. To obtain the optimally levered firm value, we need to compute explicitly the total tax benefit, the total bankruptcy cost, and the total transactions cost of all future issues of debt. Generally, this is a difficult problem because the issuance of future debt depends on the fact that the firm has not gone bankrupt. We employ a scaling property and a fixed-point argument to obtain the present values of the total tax benefit, the total bankruptcy cost, and the total transactions cost explicitly. Valuation formulas are derived in closed form and numerical solutions are used to obtain comparative statics.
In our model, the trade-off between tax shields and bankruptcy costs associated with debts yields an optimal capital structure. Firms may issue new debt as firm values change over time. The trade-off between the gains of dynamically adjusting the debt level and the transactions costs of doing so yields an optimal debt maturity structure. The optimal capital structure and the optimal maturity structure are interdependent. The interest rate is modelled as a three-factor Vasicek (1977) mean-reverting process. Modelling the interest rate as a mean-reverting process allows us to examine separately the impact of the long-run mean and the initial value of the interest rate.
Our numerical results indicate that the long-run mean of the interest rate is an important determinant of the optimal capital structure. This is intuitive because the long-run mean plays a key role in the determination of the tax shields and bankruptcy costs associated with all future debt issues. The initial interest rate level is important in determining the price of current outstanding risky bonds, especially those with short and moderate maturities. The reason is that it takes time for the interest rate to revert to its mean level.
Our results indicate that the maturity of a bond is also an important determinant in capital structure considerations. For example, if a firm can issue debt more frequently due to lower issuing costs, then it may issue less debt in the current period so as to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy because the firm has an option to issue more debt in the future. The optimal leverage ratio of about 30% obtained from our dynamic model compares favorably with the historical average for a typical large publicly traded firm in the U.S. On the other hand, static models such as the Leland (1994) model typically predict a very high leverage ratio (e.g., 80%). Furthermore, the optimal maturities generated from our dynamic model are consistent in spirit with the empirical observations of Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) .
In summary, our results suggest that a dynamic model of capital structure and debt maturity with stochastic interest rates is important to price risky debt and determine optimal capital and maturity structures appropriately.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and derives various closed-form valuation expressions. Section 3 presents numerical results.
Section 4 summarizes and concludes. More technical materials can provided in the two appendices. Appendix A reviews the forward risk-neutral measure used to derive the valuation formulas in Section 2 and Appendix B presents the proof of a scaling property used in Subsection 2.4.
The Model
In this section we first set up the valuation problem and then derive the valuation formulas in closed form.
The Setup
In this subsection we provide the main assumptions and notations used throughout the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1 Financial markets are dynamically complete, and trading takes place continuously. Therefore, there exists an equivalent martingale measure (Harrion and Kreps, 1979) or a risk-neutral measure (Cox and Ross, 1976) , Q, under which discounted price processes are martingales.
Assumption 2 The total value of the firm's unlevered asset, V t , is described by a geometric
Brownian motion process given by (under the risk-neutral measure Q) Given this interest rate process, the price of a zero-coupon bond at time t with a maturity of T years is given by
where
Assumption 4 Bankruptcy occurs when the firm's asset value falls below a default boundary V B (y t , t; P, T ), which is specified by
where P is the face value of the debt and γ is a constant parameter.
the firm is solvent and makes the contractual coupon payment to its bondholders. In the event of bankruptcy, bondholders receives φV B (y t , t; P, T ) with φ ∈ [0, 1) and shareholders receive nothing.
Note that V B (y t , t; P, T ) has the desired property that at the maturity date, it equals the face value of the debt, implying that to avoid default the asset value has to be at least as large as the debt's face value. V B (y t , t; P, T ) has a stochastic part that depends on Λ(y t , t; T ) as well as a deterministic part that depends on e
γ(T −t)
. When γ = 0, the default boundary is the riskless price of the face value and it may become very small compared to the face value of the debt for a large T and t << T . This implies that the firm would have to serve the debt (paying the contractual coupon) even if the asset value becomes very low as long as it is above a very low boundary. The shareholders may choose not to do so. Although it is extremely difficult to determine an endogenous default boundary, especially in a dynamic model like ours, the factor e γ (T −t) can ensure that the asset value will not become too low before default is triggered.
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The exponent, γ, controls the level of the net worth before 5 Indeed, Leland and Toft (1996) demonstrate that their endogenously determined default level may even be above the face value of the debt in their debt-rollover model for very short maturities. For longer maturities, they find that the optimal default level is below the face value of the debt. Thus the firm may continue to operate even if its net worth is negative (V t < P ) if no bond covenants force the firm to default. default is triggered. Let V B (y 0 , 0; P, T ) = P Λ(y 0 , 0; T )e γT = ϕP . We choose
to control the level and shape of the default boundary and fix γ accordingly. For example, if ϕ = 0.9, the initial value of the boundary equals 0.9 of the face value of the debt. The capital structures in Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) are static in the sense that as the firm's asset value evolves, the coupon rate and the face value of the debt remains the same. This is clearly not optimal. For example, if the firm's asset value increases, the debt value should be increased to better exploit the tax shields. The new capital structure strategy in Assumption 5 allows the firm to scale up (down) the debt value depending on whether the firm's asset value is above (below) the initial asset value when the firm rebalances its capital structure. For example, if the firm's asset value has increased, the firm's optimal debt capacity has also increased. Then it is optimal to scale up the debt value when the firm issues new debt.
To examine the optimal maturity in a dynamic capital structure model, we need to introduce a transaction cost associated with issuing and servicing the debt. The reason is that without the cost of issuing and retiring debt, the firm would rebalance its capital structure continuously.
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For tractability, we assume a transaction cost proportional to the value of the debt issued.
Preliminary Development
The stochastic nature of the interest rate and the default boundary complicate the pricing of securities in this model tremendously. Nevertheless, the change of measure technique can be used fruitfully to obtain the formulas in closed form. Before we present these formulas in the next two subsections, we derive some preliminary results.
First, define the first passage time τ as τ = min{t : V t ≤ V B (y t , t; P, T )}, which is the first time at which the asset value V t hits V B (y t , t; P, T ) in some state ω ∈ Ω under Q. Next,
It is clear that τ is the first passage time that X t , starting at
reaches the origin. Ito's lemma yields
Note that although the drifts of dV t /V t and dV B (y t , t; P, T )/V B (y t , t; P, T ) are stochastic, that of dX t is deterministic.
In the next two subsections, we need the following three quantities:
where 1(·) is the indicator function and where F (·), H(·) and G(·) all depend on T because σ pi (t; T ) in equation (10) does.
To obtain F (t; T, X 0 ) in closed form, using the results in Appendix A,
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we can define the 7 For simplicity of exposition, a one-factor interest process is assumed in Appendix A. The results can be easily applied to our three-factor model. following equivalent measure (to Q), R t , by 
and W Rt s is a new standard Wiener process under R t . Using the Girsanov theorem and the newly defined R t , we have
Hence, F (t; T, X 0 ) is the distribution function (under R t ) of the first passage time τ .
Tedious derivation yields
Here N (·) is the standard normal distribution function and Σ, µ f are given by
where the χ ki 's (k = 1, 2, 3, 4, i = 1, 2, 3) are given by
Similar steps show that G(t; T, X 0 ) is the distribution function of τ under R T and
Finally, to obtain H(t; T, X 0 ) in closed form, we define another equivalent measure (to 
where W R t s is a new standard Wiener process under R t .
Using the Girsanov theorem and the newly defined R t , we have
Thus, H(t; T, X 0 ) is the complementary distribution function of τ under R t and given by
Valuation Formulas in Closed Form
Consider a bond that pays a coupon rate C, has a face value P , and matures at time T . The payment rate d(s) to the bondholders at any time s is equal to (s ≤ T )
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
Using the results from the previous subsection, we have the debt value
Note that, to obtain the last two terms in (36), we have used both the relation: Let D(T, X 0 ; y 0 , P ) = λP Λ(y 0 , 0; T ). That is, the debt is issued at λ times the price of a riskless discount bond with the same face value. The debt is issued at (above or below) par if λ is equal to (greater than or smaller than) 1/Λ(y 0 , 0; T ). We require that the initial debt be priced at par by setting λ = 1/Λ(y 0 , 0; T ). We assume that all future debts are also issued at λ times the riskless discount bond price with the face value of the debt issued.
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When the coupon of C is paid, θC, where θ is the tax rate, is deducted from corporate taxes. Thus, the tax shield from the current issue of debt is θ times the first term in (36).
That is, the tax shield is given by
, from (36) we have
When bankruptcy occurs, φ fraction of the asset value is paid to bondholders and the rest, (1 − φ) fraction, is lost to the bankruptcy process. Therefore, the bankruptcy cost is easily seen to be
The (proportional) transaction cost of issuing the debt is given by
where κ is the transaction cost per dollar issued.
From (39), (40), and (41), it is clear that, given both T and those parameters exogenous to the model, the tax shield, bankruptcy cost, and transactions cost depend only on one choice variable, X 0 , which in term depends on P since X 0 = log(V 0 /λP Λ(y 0 , 0, T )).
Total Values in the Presence of Future Periods
Even though at any one point in time there is only one issue of debt outstanding, the total levered firm value will reflect the benefits and costs of all future issues of debt. Therefore we need to find the total tax benefit, total bankruptcy cost, and total transaction cost from all future periods. But the existence of all future periods depends on the firm not having gone bankrupt in all previous periods. This is a multi-period conditional first passage time problem. Generally, such problems are very difficult to solve. Fortunately, we are able to transform this difficult problem into a simple one-period fixed-point problem as we show now.
Consider the value of the tax shield at time T from the debt issued at time T . Similarly to (39), the tax shield is given by
) with P 2 being the face value of the second debt.
Note that (42) has exactly the same functional form as (39) except for the scaling factor, V T versus V 0 . Indeed, it is clear that the tax benefit of any debt issued in the future will have the same functional form as (39) but scale with the firm's asset value. But the scaling factor of the firm's asset value does not affect the optimal X. Hence, if the initial optimal capital structure corresponds to an optimal value X * for X 0 , X * must also be the optimal value for X T for the optimal capital structure at time T . In fact, X * will be the optimal value for all future debt issues. Appendix B presents a detailed proof of this result.
Consequently, the total tax shield from the current and all future issues of debt also scales with the asset value when the debt is issued. For example, if we let T B(T, X 0 ) denote the total tax benefit at time zero from the first issue of debt at time zero and all succeeding issues of debt and T B 2 (T, X 0 ) denote the total tax benefit at time T from the debt issued at time T and all succeeding issues of debt, then T B 2 (T,
the total tax benefit T B(T, X 0 ) at time zero is the tax benefit tb(T, X 0 ) from the debt issued at time zero, plus the present value of the total tax benefit T B 2 (T,
at time T , conditional on no default occurred. Therefore, we have
and its closed form formula is given in (33).
Equation (43) indicates that the total tax shield T B(T, X 0 ) is a linear function of T B(T, X 0 )
itself. Thus, we have reduced the complex multi-period problem to a simple fixed-point problem whose solution is given by
Similar arguments show that the total bankruptcy cost BC and transaction cost T C are, respectively, given by
Notice that TB, BC, and TC do not depend directly on the interest rate or its three factors.
They only depend indirectly on the interest rate through the variable X 0 .
The total levered firm value consists of four terms: the firm's unlevered asset value, plus the value of tax shields, less the value of bankruptcy costs, less the transactions costs of issuing debt:
The equity value E(T, X 0 ; P ) is given by the total levered firm value less the debt value, i.e.
E(T, X
where P is the value of the debt because it is priced at par.
Note that given other parameters of the model, the total levered firm value T V (T, X 0 ) is a function of only T and X 0 .
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The firm chooses these two variables to maximize T V (T, X 0 ). This is a simple unconstrained bivariate maximization problem and a number of efficient library routines are well suited for this problem.
3 Numerical Results and Comparative Statics
In this section, we implement the dynamic optimal capital structure model developed in the previous section. Although the valuation formulas are obtained in closed form, the joint determination of optimal capital structure and debt maturity structure needs to be performed numerically. In the numerical calculations, the base parameters are fixed as follows: the asset return volatility σ v = 0.2; the corporate tax rate θ = 0.35; the per dollar transaction cost of issuing debt κ = 2%; 12 the bankruptcy cost parameter φ = 0.5; the initial values of the three interest rate factors y 1 (0) = 6%, y 2 (0) = 0, y 3 (0) = 0; the correlation coefficients between the firm's asset return and the three interest rate factors ρ 1 = 0, ρ 2 = 0, ρ 3 = 0. The payout rate δ is set so that initially the payout covers the net coupon rate and the dividend on equity. That is, δ is the solution to δ = [(1 − θ)C + δ E E]/V 0 , where δ E is the dividend yield on equity.
13
We set δ E = 1.5% which is about the current dividend yield on equity. The parameter values for the interest rate process are: α 1 = 0.02, β 1 = 0.3333, σ 1 = 0.02; α 2 = 0,
14 Note that, because we have set the initial values of the second and the third factors at zero, the first factor is the 'major' one whose base parameter values resemble the empirical estimates from a one-factor Vasicek model.
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10 Recall that X 0 = log(V 0 /λP Λ(y 0 , 0, T )). Therefore, once the optimal T and X 0 are obtained, the optimal debt value P can be easily recovered.
11 For example, 'bconf' from IMSL Math Library (2003) or 'frprmn' from Numerical Recipes (2003) .
12 The transaction cost of issuing bonds is usually between 1% and 4%. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) have used transaction costs ranging from 1% to 10% while Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1985) have considered 1% and 2% transaction costs.
13 Since the optimal C and E are functions of δ, this is a nonlinear equation for δ. 14 To overcome the identification issue, α 2 and α 3 are exogenously fixed at 0. For more details, see Dai and Singleton (2000) and Liu, Longstaff and Mandell (2003) . We thank Jay Huang for bring the second reference to our attention.
15 See, for example, Aït-Sahalia (1999) . In particular, the long-run mean of the first factor is 6%.
The second and third factors add fluctuations around the value of the first factor. In our calculations we find that the added variability from these two 'minor' factors has small effects on a firm's capital structure and maturity structure. The reason is that the variability of the interest rate process is small relative to that of the firm's asset return process. We consider three different values (0.8, 0.9, 1.0) for the default boundary level and shape parameter ϕ.
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The numerical results are reported in Table 1 and Table 2 .
3.1 Optimal Capital Structure Table 1 reports the comparative statics with constant interest rates and Table 2 reports the comparative statics with stochastic interest rates. Several features are notable.
Generally, the stochastic nature of the interest rate process, except for the long-run mean, has a small impact on firms' optimal leverage ratios. The reason is simple. While at any time there is only one finite maturity debt outstanding, the optimal capital structure is based on the total tax shield and default cost associated with the existing debt and all future debts.
It is the long-run mean rather than the current interest rate level that will have the greatest impact on the values of these future debts. However, this is not to say that the current level and the stochastic nature of the interest rate process are not important. It clearly affects the value of the existing debt. For example, for the middle entry of Panel E in Table 1 with a constant interest rate 4%, the bond price is 31.562, whereas a bond with the same maturity, coupon, face value, (T , C, P ) = (5.901, 1.305, 31.562), and an initial interest level 4%, the bond price with the stochastic interest rate is 30.090. If we keep the coupon and face value the same, but change the debt maturity to 10 years, then the bond price with a 4% constant interest rate will be 31.116 while that with the stochastic interest rate will be 28.495.
When the initial interest rate is at or close to its long-run mean, however, the price of the same bond (same maturity, coupon rate, and face value) with the stochastic interest rate will be close to that when the interest rate is a constant. For example, for the bond in the middle entry of Panel A in Table 1 , where the initial interest rate is 6%, the bond price with the stochastic interest rate is 36.771, which is close to the price of 36.623 with a constant interest 6%. If we change the maturity to 10 years, the prices, 36.321 and 36.092, are still close.
Clearly, if the current interest rate is close to its long-run mean, the stochastic nature of the interest rate has small effects on the optimal capital structure or the bond price. However, when the initial interest rate is far away from its long-run mean, the prices of bonds with the same maturity, coupon and face value can be quite different whether the interest rate is a constant or stochastic. In short, the capital structure is affected more by the long-run mean of the interest rate process while the value of the existing debt is affected more by the current interest rate level.
Second, the leverage ratios obtained from our model compare favorably with the historical average of about 30% for a typical large publicly traded firm in the US, while most static optimal capital structure models predict leverage ratios much higher than what is observed.
(See, e.g., Leland (1994) .) The reason for the lower leverage ratio in our dynamic model is that, in a static model, a firm cannot adjust its debt level in the future, and therefore issues debt more aggressively. In contrast, a firm with an option to restructure in the future issues debt less aggressively, for it can adjust its capital structure when the firm's asset value changes. Moreover, the cost of default for the firm includes not only the cost of bankruptcy, but also the loss of the option value of adjusting the debt level in the future. Hence, default is more costly in the dynamic setting, further decreasing the initial optimal leverage ratio.
Third, with a lower bankruptcy trigger level (smaller ϕ), a firm optimally levers more. The reason is that with a lower bankruptcy level, the probability and expected cost of bankruptcy are both lower. We can think of the level of ϕ as the strength of the bond covenants to force bankruptcy. As the rights of bondholders to force default increase (higher ϕ), firms find it optimal to use less leverage. However, the differences are very small. In our dynamic model, the optimally chosen debt maturity is inversely related to ϕ. While a higher ϕ implies a higher probability of default for a given maturity, a lower maturity decreases the default probability. These two effects partially offset each other. This indicates that a different default triggering boundary or mechanism will not have affected our results significantly.
Four, the comparison of the last two panels in Thus, σ v has a first-order effect on the pricing of securities.
Last, in Panels K-P of Table 2 , we examine the comparative statics on the term structure parameters α 1 , β 1 , and σ 1 . When α 1 changes, the long-run mean of y 1t also changes. The corresponding long-run mean is 3% in Panel K and 9% in Panel L. Note that a firm optimally issues more debt if the long-run mean of the interest rate process is higher, similar to the effects of a higher initial interest rate level as Panels E and F indicate.
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Panels M and N consider the effect of the speed of the mean-reverting parameter β 1 . Since α 1 /β 1 represents the long-run mean, when α 1 is fixed, a higher β 1 means a lower long-run mean. Similar to the results for changing α 1 , the firm issues more debt when β 1 is lower. Panels O and P indicate that although the interest rate volatility increases four times from 0.01 in Panel O to 0.04 in Panel P, the effect of it is quite small. The reason is that the return of the asset value is much more volatile than the interest rate process and thus the added volatility in the interest rate process has little impact on the first passage time to the default boundary.
Our calculations thus suggest that the long-run mean is more important than the typical volatility of the stochastic interest rate process.
Further Comments on the Relation between Firm Value and Interest Rate Level
Notice that the comparison of Panels E and F in the two tables indicates that a firm optimally levers more when the interest rate is higher. This result seems counterintuitive. We must note 17 See, for example, (17).
18 Caution is required in interpreting this comparative static result. See the next subsection for a discussion.
that, however, the results in the tables are comparative statics, which means that, among other inputs, the initial asset value V 0 is maintained the same (at $100 in our calculations).
Given the same cash flow from a firm's assets, the initial asset value of the firm will be different for a different interest rate level. We have scaled the firm values so that the initial values are always 100. Therefore, one should not conclude that for the same cash flow, a firm optimally levers more at a higher interest rate level.
To illustrate our point, we consider a simple example. Assume that the cash flow of the firm's assets follows a geometric Brownian motion process:
where µ and σ π are constants and W t is a standard Wiener process. Further assume that the interest rate is a constant r and that the risk premium of the asset return is a constant λ. The value of the firms's assets is then given by
Note that Equation (47) is similar to the constant growth rate dividend discount model where µ is the growth rate of the cash flow and λ the risk premium. Equation (47) clearly demonstrates that, given the same cash flow process, the firm's asset value is inversely related to the interest rate.
To provide a concrete numerical example, we assume that π 0 = 6, r = 0.06, λ = µ.
Hence, the firm's asset value is given by V 0 = 100. Panel A in Table 1 shows that with φ = 0.9 and κ = 0.02, the firm optimally issues 36.623 in debt and the levered firm value is 118.661. Now suppose instead r = 0.04. The firm's asset value is then given by V 0 = 150.
Therefore, for the same cash flow, the debt and levered firm value in the middle entry of Panel E should be multiplied by 1.5. be multiplied by 0.75. Therefore, the optimal debt and firm value are 30.069 and 92.056, respectively, when r = 0.08 and V 0 = 75. Consequently, we have obtained that the optimal debt value and levered firm value are inversely related to the interest rate level, consistent with the intuition.
However, even though the firm's asset value, levered value and optimal debt value all decrease as the interest rate increases, the optimal leverage ratio is higher. The reason is that at a higher interest rate, the risk-neutral drift of the asset value process is higher and the risk-neutral default probability becomes lower for the same debt value. Therefore, the proportional decrease of the optimal debt value is less than that of the firm's asset value and levered value. As a consequence the firm optimally borrows less but the optimal leverage ratio is higher when the interest rate is higher. Hence, care should be taken to interpret some of the comparative statics.
Note that V t as given in Equation (47) is proportional to π t , so V t also follows a geometric Brownian motion process. If r follows a stochastic process (e.g., a Vasicek process), the resulting V t will still be inversely related to the initial interest rate level but V t will no longer follow a geometric Brownian motion process. For tractability and following the capital structure literature, we have assumed that V t follows a geometric motion process. But the intuition that the optimal debt value and firm value are inversely related to the interest rate level should still hold.
Optimal Maturity Structure
The shareholders' strategic consideration of dynamic adjustments of the debt level yields an optimal maturity structure. The trade-off in this case is between the transactions costs of issuing debt and the gains of adjusting debt level dynamically. On the one hand, the firm should issue short maturity debt and therefore gives itself the opportunity to issue new debt optimally, depending on the firm value when the old debt matures. On the other hand, if new debt is issued too often, transactions costs will become too large. When the firm behaves optimally, in addition to an optimal capital structure, an optimal maturity structure emerges.
The optimal maturities are reported in Column 3 in Table 1 and Table 2 . The tables show that the two most important parameters are the tax rate and the transactions costs because the optimal maturity is the result of the trade-off between the transactions costs and the gains of adjusting the debt level depending on future firm values. Barclay and Smith (1995) find that during the period of 1974-1992, firms in their sample have 51.7% of their debts due in more than three years. Because on average, the debt would have existed for half of the lifetime at any point in time, the median maturity at issue appears to be a little over six years. Stohs and Mauer (1996) find that the median time to maturity is 3.38 years for their sample. Therefore the mean maturity of all debts at issue appears to be between six and seven years, consistent with Barclay and Smith (1995) . Most of the optimal maturities in the two tables are between 4 and 6 years, comparing favorably with the empirical values. While most of our theoretical values are smaller than 6 years, it is to be noted that the optimal maturities in Panel B with a 20% effective tax rate are quite close to 6 years. Even though 35% is the top corporate tax rate, the effective corporate tax rate for most firms is likely to be lower due to investment credit, loss-carry forward, and personal tax effects.
The comparison of the middle part of Panel A with those of Panel C and Panel D
indicates that the optimal debt maturity is inversely related to asset volatility. This is due to the option-like effect. The higher the asset volatility, the greater the value of the option to adjust the capital structure in the future. The gains of dynamically adjusting the debt level are reduced if the firm is less volatile. Thus, the firm restructures its capital structure less
frequently. This appears to be consistent with the empirical evidence. For example, in the sample of Barclay and Smith (1995) , 36.6% of equally weighted debts mature in more than five years, but 45.9% of the value-weighted debts mature in more than five years. Therefore larger firms tend to have longer maturity debts. Because larger and more mature firms are less volatile than smaller and less mature ones, it follows that less volatile firms have longer maturity debts.
Panels A, E, and F indicate that the optimal debt maturity is inversely related to the level of the interest rate. When the interest rate is low, the percentage growth in the firm's asset value, as given in Equation (1), is also low. When the growth in the asset value is small, the potential benefit of adjusting the debt level is small. Therefore, the firm optimally issues longer maturity debts when the term structure is upward sloping, i.e., when the initial interest rate level is below the long-run mean. When the initial interest rate is above the long-run mean with a downward sloping term structure, the firm correctly infers that the future interest rate will likely be lower, so the firm optimally issues debts with shorter maturity dates so that it can issue new debt sooner at a lower interest rate. Similarly, the term structure is downward sloping in Panel K and upward sloping in Panel L. Consistent
with Panel E and Panel F, Panel K and Panel L demonstrate that the optimal maturity is shorter in a downward sloping term structure environment. Notice that because the optimal maturity does not depend on the initial asset value, the results presented in this subsection
are not subject to the comments of the last subsection.
Concluding Remarks
The existing models of the optimal capital structure consider neither stochastic interest rates nor a maturity structure. This paper develops a model of optimal capital structure and maturity structure with a three-factor Vasicek interest rate process. Valuation formulas are obtained in closed form. A novel fixed-point argument is used to obtain the total tax shield, default cost, and transaction cost for the dynamic model with potentially an infinite number of debt issues.
The trade-off between the bankruptcy costs and the tax shields of debts yields an optimal capital structure. The trade-off between the gains of adjusting the capital structure periodically and the costs of doing so yields an optimal maturity structure. Indeed, optimal capital structure and optimal maturity structure are interdependent and must be determined jointly and simultaneously.
The optimal maturity in our dynamic model appears to be reasonable compared to the median maturities observed in empirical studies. The trade-off between the transaction costs of issuing bonds and the gains of adjusting bonds dynamically may not be the only factors determining an optimal maturity structure. Nevertheless, our model indicates that they could be important factors. In addition, the term structure of the interest rate is an important factor in the determination of an optimal maturity structure.
Our dynamic model indicates that the firm does not issue debt to take advantage of the tax shield as aggressively as a static model implies. The reason is that, due to the possibility of bankruptcy, the firm does not want to issue too much debt to risk losing the ability to adjust its debt level in the future. This brings the leverage ratio in the dynamic model much closer to the actual leverage ratios observed in practice than the high leverage ratios predicted by most static models.
When the interest rate is assumed to be a constant, the level of the interest rate has a significant impact on both the optimal coupon and optimal maturity. When the interest rate is assumed to follow a mean-reverting stochastic process, however, both the long-run mean as well as the current level of the interest rate process are required to price the risky bond and determine the optimal capital structure of the firm. On the one hand, the current interest rate level is crucial in the pricing of risky debts. On the other hand, the long-run mean plays a key role in the determination of the tax shields and bankruptcy costs resulting from the future debts. Therefore, a model of optimal capital structure with a constant interest rate cannot simultaneously price risky corporate debts and determine the optimal capital structure appropriately. A stochastic interest rate process is needed to account for the evolution of the interest rate. While the long-run mean is shown to be important in determining the optimal capital structure, numerical results indicate that the correlation between the stochastic interest rate and the return of the firm's asset has little impact.
For tractability, the default boundary V B (y t , t; P, T ) is exogenously specified. Extending
A The Forward Risk-Neutral Measure
In this appendix, we use the Girsanov theorem to derive the T -forward risk-neutral measure in a multi-dimensional setting. Without loss of generality, we assume a probability space Q generated by two standard Wiener processes
with correlation matrixρ
In the following, Q should be interpreted as the risk-neutral probability measure and r t the riskless interest rate given by
We leave other random variables generated by W Q 1t and W Q 2t unspecified. Suppose we want to compute the following expectation
where {· · ·} indicates that Z({· · ·}, T ) may depend on the sample path in space Q from 0 to T . Let Λ(r 0 , 0; T ) be the discount bond price at t = 0 with maturity T . Define
Then, we have
It is clear that ξ T is strictly positive and E Q [ξ T ] = 1. Therefore it can be used as a RadonNikodym derivative to define a new probability measure R T equivalent to the original measure
for any event A. Under the new forward risk-neutral measure R T ,
To find the Wiener processes under R T , define the likelihood ratio
Ito's lemma implies that
The term inside the square bracket is the fundamental PDE satisfied by the discounted bond price Λ, therefore (with another application of Ito's lemma)
where T denotes transpose and
Now the multi-dimensional Girsanov theorem implies that W
are two standard Winner processes with the correlation matrixρ(t). In differential form, we
B Further Discussion of the Scaling Property
In this appendix, we provide a detailed discussion of the scaling property used in Subsection 2.4 to calculate the total firm value with potentially an infinite number of periods. A key result is that the optimal solution X * , remain the same for all the bonds issued by the firm.
Let T n = (n − 1)T and τ n be the first passage time when V t = V B (y t , t; P, T ) in period n. Note that from (39)- (41), the net benefit of debt (tax benefit of debt less the default cost and the issuance cost) in the first period can be rewritten as
where f (T, X T 1 ) is given by
Similarly, the net benefit of debt in period n is given by
Therefore, the total net benefit at T 1 = 0 is given by
vT n has been used to obtain the second equality, and, as a result, the second equality no longer depends directly on the stochastic interest rate.
In (66), X T n is the choice variable of the firm in period n and τ n is the first passage time of the process X t given in (8), starting at X Tn > 0, to reach the origin during period n.
To obtain (66) in closed form, consider the total net benefit at T 2 = T , T N B T 2 . It is easy to see that T N B T 2 is given by
where X Tm is the choice variable of the firm in period m and τ m is the first passage time of the process X t given in (8), starting at X T m > 0, to reach the origin during period m.
Note that, besides the factors V T 1 and V T 2 , (66) and (67) have the same functional form of the choice variables. That is, if we let
then we have
Therefore, if the optimal value of X T 1 in (66), which is the choice variable at time zero, is X * , X * must also be the optimal value for X T 1 in (67), which is the choice variable at time T . Note that at time zero the firm's objective is to maximize the total firm value
Equivalently, the firm maximizes
, which is independent of the firm's initial value V T 1 . Likewise, the firm
Suppose that at time zero the optimal solution for the first period is given by X * 0 . At time T , the optimal solution for the first period, which is the second period viewed at time zero, must be the same as X *
have the same form. In other words, the optimal solutions for X 0 and X T are the same in the first two periods. Similarly, it can be seen that the optimal value for X T n in all periods must be the same. We denote this solution by X * .
24
Now the optimal total net benefits at time zero and time T can be concisely expressed as T N B 0 (T, X * ) and T N B T (T, X * ), respectively. It is easy to see that T N B T (T, X * ) = 23 For notational purpose, we have renamed T as time zero. In other words, the first period starts at T when we compute the total net benefit of debts at T .
24 A key point is that at times zero, T , 2T , · · ·, the firm faces an infinite horizon and the U functions take the same form. Hence, the optimal solution for the first period viewed at different times must be the same.
). This relation is used next to obtain the optimal total net benefit in closed form.
The optimal total net benefit T N B 0 (T, X * ) at time zero is the net benefit from the debt issued at time zero, N B 0 (T, X 0 ), which is given in (63), plus the present value of the optimal total net benefit T N B T (T, X * ) = V T /V 0 T N B 0 (T, X * ) at time T , conditional on no default occurred. Therefore, we have
is (45) Column 1 represents the level and shape parameter ϕ in the default boundary. Column 2 denotes the transaction cost of every dollar debt issued κ. r 0 is the constant interest rate. The other parameters are given in the panels. Columns 3-8 represent the optimal maturity, optimal coupon rate, optimal debt value, credit spread, optimal leverage ratio, and optimal levered firm value, respectively. 
